Simple explanation on why QKD keys have not been proved secure by Yuen, Horace
ar
X
iv
:1
40
8.
47
80
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
0 A
ug
 20
14
SIMPLE EXPLANATION ON WHY QKD KEYS HAVE NOT
BEEN PROVED SECURE
Horace P. Yuen
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Department of Physics and Astronomy
Northwestern University, Evanston Il. 60208
email: yuen@eecs.northwestern.edu
Abstract
A simple counter-example is given on the prevalent interpretation of the trace distance criterion
as failure probability in quantum key distribution protocols. A summary of its ramifications is listed.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is widely perceived to have been proved “secure” in various pro-
tocols, in contrast to conventional encryption methods. In particular, perfect security is taken to hold
with a high probability [1] for finite concrete protocols. In this short note we give a simple explanation
on why that is not the case and summarize some of the major ramifications. The reader can trace some
details from the literature.
Protection of data privacy has become an increasingly important problem that affects even our daily
lives. Let Adam and Babe be two users with private communications and Eve an attacker who wants
to learn about the communication content. Protection can be obtained by the mod-2 addition of each
“plaintext” data bit Xi by a key bit Ki to form the “ciphertext” bit Yi, i the index for the sequence.
If the bits Ki are uniformly distributed, i.e., each Ki takes the bit value 0 or 1 with probability 1/2
and is statistically independent of other Ki bits, perfect secrecy on Xi is obtained in that Eve who
intercepts the ciphertext cannot tell what Xi is, other than the guess it is 0 or 1 with probability 1/2.
This “one-time pad” encryption requires pre-shared sequence K = {Ki} between the users to be as long
as the data sequence X = {Xi}, which is impractical in most application situations. In conventional
cryptography a cipher with short shared secret key K that is often obtained by public-key method, is
used as the seed key of an encryption cypher in lieu of one-time pad. The security of such approach
depends on the unproved complexity based security on the public-key generation of K and the unproved
security of the encryption cipher with a short seed key. QKD proposes to provide “information theoretic
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security” for the generation of long K which is perfect (the uniform random variable U to Eve) and can
be used in “one-time pad” encryption of the data X .
However, it is not possible to guarantee the generation of a perfect key from QKD. The use of a
quantum trace distance criterion d is currently adopted [1] to measure the deviation from a perfect key
K = U . The interpretation [2] is that d gives the maximum “failure probability” of the QKD scheme,
and “failure” means the key is not perfect. Thus under d the QKD generated key K is asserted to be
the random U to Eve except for a probability d. The best value of d in theory that has been obtained
thus far [3] for a vanishing key generation rate is ∼ 10−14, and experimentally for ∼ 100 Kbps key rate
it is ∼ 10−9 [4].
It turns out that in the case of “failure” the key may be totally compromised [5] in that d is essentially
the probability that Eve may estimate the whole K correctly and hence recover the entire plaintext
sequenceX from the ciphertext sequence Y , the latter always taken to be known to an attacker. Assuming
the failure probability interpretation of d is correct, which we’ll show is not, a level of even d ∼ 10−14 may
be far from adequately secure depending on the total number of rounds carried out. The derived d level
is actually an average over the family of privacy amplification codes. In terms of individual probability
guarantee the effective d level becomes d1/2. According to the correct interpretation, it becomes d1/3
for ciphertext-only attacks and d1/4 for known-plaintext attacks [6]. Thus, the above theoretical and
experimental values are not adequate for meaningful security guarantee.
Next, we will show d is not the probability of K being not perfect. Generally K is not perfect with
probability 1 [6,7] and not d [1]. Consider known-plaintext attack onK whenK is used as “one-time pad”
encryption, which can be readily launched in at least commercial communications. In such a scenario,
Eve knows a portion of the data, say the first m bits of {Xi}. From the corresponding ciphertext {Yi},
she would get the first m bits of {Ki}. Since K is not perfect, there may be correlations between these
first m bits of {Ki} and the rest of the Ki’s. Thus Eve would learn something about the rest of {Xi}
from the {Yi} and such Ki correlation.
It is easy to see how a key K with security level d may be totally compromised in a known-plaintext
attack. The trace distance reduces to a statistical distance guarantee δE between Eve’s probability
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distribution {Pi} on K and the uniform distribution U
δE =
1
2
Σi |Pi − Ui| (1)
From her attack Eve obtains her probability distribution {Pi} on the N = 2
n possible values of the n-bit
QKD generated key K [5]. The security level from d guarantees only that Eve’s {Pi} must satisfy (1)
with δE no bigger than d.
Consider the case where a specific first m bits in K determines the rest uniquely so that Eve’s {Pi}
is transformed from U as follows. Let the specific first m bits with one unique sequence of following
bits which absorbs the total probability of all the 2n−m following bits, and let the other bit sequence
remains at the U level of 2−n. Then from (1) it is easily calculated that δE for such a distribution {Pi}
is 2−m. Thus, at d = 2−m, knowing m bits in a known-plaintext attack may totally compromise the
key K with probability 1. On the other hand, from the “failure probability” interpretation of d with
or without the “universal composition” claim of [2], the failure probability remains at d regardless of
what m-bit portion of K is known to Eve. This counter-example shows explicitly the failure probability
interpretation of d is incorrect. At d ∼ 10−14 ∼ 2−46, it is not guaranteed that the whole key K is not
compromised from knowing just 46 bits of data. Generally, there are many possible partial leaks with
possible high probabilities for given known bits of K from a known-plaintext attack which need to be
protected against.
We would not repeat our discussions [5,6,7] on how the incorrect interpretation was invalidly derived
and what the general situation of Eve’s distribution {Pi} actually is under a d-level guarantee. A
stronger condition has to be imposed on the {Pi} for it to hold which is not covered by a fixed d level [6].
However, it may be mentioned that another reason was offered in support of the wrong d interpretation
through “indistinguishability” between the actual and the ideal cryptographic situations, which confuses
the mathematical meaning of such “indistinguishability” and its daily life meaning (plus the Leibniz
principle on the identity of indiscernibles). Sometimes security is taken to be a matter of definition or
stipulation through terms like “ǫ-secure”, although operational security meaning must be provided for
any criterion.
While the wrong interpretation gives too strong a guarantee, for a given d level one can prove an
average guarantee on Eve’s success probabilities over the known m bits of K [6]. In the above counter-
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example there is a probability guarantee through the average guarantee, at an effective d ∼ 10−14/4 >
10−4. So the d criterion may be fine if its guaranteed level can be made much smaller than that currently
predicted.
In QKD security proofs without known-plaintext attack, already the d level derived is a double
average, averaged over the possible privacy amplification codes and over the possible measurement results
of Eve from her probing attack. When Markov inequality is used to convert an average guarantee to
a probabilistic guarantee, the effective probability guarantee is changed to d1/3. With the additional
average over the known portion of K in a known-plaintext attack, it becomes d1/4 [6].
Why is probability guarantee needed and not just average? Because probability is a more opera-
tionally meaningful guarantee, as probability and not average is used in the quality control of common
product manufacturing. Say, consider the situation where with 50/50 chance a cryptosystem is either
secure for 100 years or not secure at all, with an average of 50 years security. Furthermore, too little
rounds would be made in comparison to the large exponential number of possibilities in the case of
privacy amplification or measurement result averages in ciphertext-only attacks, and possibly in known
key bits average also in known-plaintext attacks. With such relatively small number of trials, average
has no operational empirical meaning because there are far from enough trials for each possibility to
appear just once.
Thus, in operational probability terms the effective d guarantee for cipher-text only attack is d > 10−5
at best theoretically and d ∼ 10−3 experimentally. For known-plaintext attack it becomes d > 10−4 and
d > 10−2.5. Even at a much lower d level there is security problem when such key is used in an
application as in message authentication or for the next QKD round [6]. It appears impossible to extend
these numbers by the many tens of order of magnitude either in theory or in practice in order to provide
meaningful security guarantee. If a probability of 10−15 for a single trial is to be considered practically
impossible and there are just 105 rounds, d would need to be 10−80 for the effective d1/4 level to be 10−20
for security guarantee. For ciphertext only attacks, obtainable QKD security level is very unfavorable
compared to the information theoretic security that can be obtained in symmetric key expansion [7]. It
seems quite inappropriate to call the guarantee that can be obtained in QKD as “unconditional security”,
particularly because there is no “security parameter” in QKD with which the security can be pushed to
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become arbitrarily close to perfect at any fixed key rate. Eve’s mutual information on K is itself not a
good quantitative criterion [1,6]. Furthermore, that it goes to zero asymptotically in the bit length |K|
does not imply |K| is a security parameter [5,6].
Quantification of security with error correction is an almost insurmountable problem. For a given
error correction procedure it is not possible to rigorously estimate how many errors Eve could correct
for herself, and with what probability, from knowledge of related public announcement. No justification
has been given for the common leakEC formula that is widely employed [6]. Even if the parity check
digits of a linear error correcting code are covered by true one-time pad, there is still the leak of the code
structural information. More significantly, with a necessarily imperfect key used to cover such digits
the resulting security is uncertain, especially at the relatively large d levels that can be obtained. The
seriousness of the problem can be seen from the use of imperfect keys in message authentication, in which
the tag length security parameter is lost due to the imperfect key [6].
We summarize the main consequences of an imperfect key from the incorrect interpretation of the
trace distance criterion:
(i) The effective trace distance level for operational individual guarantee is reduced from d1/2 to d1/3 for
ciphertext-only attack, and to d1/4 for known-plaintext attack when the key is used for encryption.
(ii) With an imperfect key there is no valid quantification on the effect of error correction, in particular
on any leakEC subtraction in a security proof.
(iii) When the key is not perfect there are other problems such as the number of bits Eve may get
correctly even though she gets a sequence incorrectly. Such problems could lead to some not yet
discovered “distinguishing attack” for a nonideal key [8].
(iv) The imperfect key leak may accumulate in an application similar to the case of message authenti-
cation.
The foundational consideration in this paper applies to all QKD protocols, including the recent
measurement-device-independent approach, and it shows that no unconditional security can yet be validly
asserted. On the other hand, proof of security is the widespread QKD claim that distinguishes it from
other known cryptographic methods. It appears that some new ingredient needs to be introduced for
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provable security. This note should be ended with the following words from [8, p.19], “soon realize
firsthand that security is incredibly subtle and that it is very easy to overlook critical weaknesses.”
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